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Degrees of independence: SNP demands in an international context 
 
Eve Hepburn, University of Edinburgh 
 
Introduction 
Independence is something of a minority preference amongst nationalist parties in 
Europe and beyond. Far from demanding sovereign statehood and a complete 
separation of powers from the host state, the vast majority of nationalist parties have 
opted for creative forms of shared sovereignty within larger state and supranational 
structures. This makes the Scottish National Party’s constitutional goals quite 
distinctive within the nationalist party family (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Türsan 
1998; Hepburn 2009a). For the SNP, independence is the only way to make Scotland 
a ‘normal nation’ (SNP 2009). Yet the SNP have refrained from advocating a 
nineteenth-century notion of statehood, based on the doctrine of indivisible, unitary 
internal sovereignty. Nor has the SNP been dogmatically committed to only one form 
of self-government for Scotland. Rather, the SNP since its inception has supported 
degrees of independence for Scotland within various larger political frameworks, 
including dominion status within the British Empire, self-government within a 
confederal British Isles, and independence in an integrating Europe. The SNP has 
regularly revised its understanding of independence, and its goals for achieving this, 
in response to changing processes of spatial rescaling at the state, supranational and 
international levels. This fluid understanding of independence has been important in 
enabling the SNP to exploit opportunities resulting from state restructuring. 
Moreover, the SNP’s support for varying degrees of independence has allowed it to 
endear itself to a Scottish electorate that is generally unfavourable to separation from 
the UK (McCrone 2009).    
 This chapter will consider how the SNP has interpreted the meaning of 
independence over the years. The first part begins with an examination of the SNP’s 
early demands for self-government, before exploring in depth the idea of 
‘independence in Europe’ (which became official party policy in 1988). In particular, 
it considers the paradox that although European integration has offered the SNP an 
external framework for supporting Scottish sovereignty, it has also undermined that 
very sovereignty by concentrating certain powers at the supranational level. The 
second section considers how the existence of a devolved Scottish Parliament has 
altered the context for pursuing independence, whereby the SNP’s strategies have 
shifted to support for ‘softer’ forms of independence and ‘devolution-max’. Following 
this, the SNP’s understanding of independence is placed in an international context, 
through comparison with nationalist party demands in Wales, Catalonia, Quebec, and 
Sardinia. Finally, the concluding section reflects on how the meaning of independence 
has been irrevocably changed in a postsovereign world, considering the challenges 
small nations face from (in particular, economic) globalisation. 
 
Changing notions of Scottish self-government 
The Scottish National Party, which was established in 1934, is one of the oldest 
existing nationalist parties in the world, and it support for independence is very much 
of an historic nature. However, independence has not always been the main demand 
of the SNP. In its early years, the SNP’s constitutional goals were of a vague and 
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underdeveloped nature, lying ‘somewhere between devolution and independence 
within the Empire’ (Lynch 2002: 10). This to an extent reflected the uneasy 
confluence of demands for Scottish self-government during the party’s formation. The 
merger of the pro-independence National Party of Scotland and the pro-Home Rule 
Scottish Party to form the SNP forced a compromise on the constitutional question. 
The end result satisfied neither party, and produced a fault line that would plague the 
SNP for decades to come, between those members wishing to remain within the UK 
and those wishing to leave it. The newly formed SNP’s goals were to establish a 
Scottish Parliament within the UK, whereby ‘Scotland shall share with England the 
rights and responsibilities they, as mother nations, have jointly created and incurred 
within the British Empire’ (Finlay 1994: 153). A partnership of ‘mother nations’ 
would include joint machinery to deal with foreign policy, defence and the creation of 
a customs union (which the SNP would later propose sharing within Europe). Clearly, 
the SNP’s first constitutional aims were marked by interdependence with, rather than 
independence from, England within the larger ambit of the British Empire.  
 In the 1930s and early 1940s, the divisions between ‘independentist’ and 
‘home rule’ factions became more sharpened, and the home rulers left the SNP to set 
up their own rival political organisation in 1942. The Scottish Convention (and later 
the Scottish Covenant Association), headed by John MacCormick, sought to build a 
cross-party consensus as well as mass popular support for Scottish devolution. The 
departure of MacCormick’s group allowed the SNP to develop a clearer position on 
the constitutional question. In 1943, the party re-wrote its constitution to focus on ‘the 
restoration of Scottish national sovereignty, by the establishment of a democratic 
Scottish government, whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as well 
be freely entered into with other nations’ (cited in Lynch 2002: 58). In the following 
decades, the SNP would develop a much stronger commitment to separating Scotland 
from the UK and establishing it as an independent sovereign state with full powers 
over its affairs. But even then, there were still ‘unifying’ aspects of the party’s 
independence line. In particular, Scotland was to remain a member of the 
Commonwealth, and the Queen would continue to be the (unelected) Head of State 
for Scotland. Moreover, the SNP was never able to completely purge itself of pro-
devolution sentiment. Some party members continued to support greater powers for 
Scotland within the UK, and with the demise of the Scottish Covenant Association 
(SCA) and the death of MacCormick in 1961, the arrival of new SCA members into 
the party further diversified the SNP’s base and consolidated the home rule and 
independence wings of the party (Brand 1978). These days, this is referred to as the 
division between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘gradualists’. The former see independence as 
a zero-sum game, whilst the latter see sovereign statehood arriving in stages.  
 In the following decades, the SNP’s position on independence was 
fundamentally altered by two processes of state restructuring. The first of these was 
the possibility of gaining devolution for Scotland in the 1970s. In response to the rise 
of the SNP and Plaid Cymru, the Labour Governments of 1974-79 sought to 
implement devolutionary measures for Scotland and Wales. Although the SNP 
believed that Labour’s plans did not go far enough to satisfy demands for self-
government, it did offer tentative support for the Scotland and Wales Bill 1977 in the 
House of Commons. But the party’s campaign on the streets was of a more 
fundamentalist nature. The SNP demanded ‘Independence Nothing Less’ in an 
attempt to reassure grass-roots supporters that it hadn’t abandoned its ultimate goal. 
Support for devolution also had important policy implications for the party. At its 
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annual conference in 1976, 58% of SNP members voted to accept an Assembly with 
limited powers. Lynch (2002: 148) describes the outcome as ‘a classic gradualist-
fundamentalist compromise over devolution’. Yet whilst the SNP became active in a 
‘Yes’ campaign for a Scottish Assembly, it refused to join a cross-party umbrella 
group with Labour and Scotland’s other parties. Such divisions within the ‘Yes’ camp 
did not bode well for a favourable vote for a Scottish Assembly and the referendum 
failed. SNP Leader Gordon Wilson blamed the poor result on ‘the indecisive 
collective direction of the party, which has wandered in only two years from full-
blooded independence to an obsession with devolution’ (Wilson 1979; cited in Lynch 
2002: 156). In the aftermath of 1979, the SNP moved once more to a more 
fundamentalist position. 
During the same period, debates on UK membership of the European 
Economic Community forced a re-evaluation of the SNP’s goal of independence. The 
SNP was during the post-war era highly suspicious of European integration. The EEC 
was viewed as centralist and elitist, and it was unclear how Scottish interests would be 
represented if the EC operated on an inter-governmental basis – with the UK 
Government taking important decisions over Scottish affairs. During the referendum 
on continued British membership of the EEC in 1975, the SNP argued that UK 
membership of the European Community conflicted with the 1707 Treaty of Union 
and campaigned on the theme ‘No voice, no entry’ (Lynch 1996: 31). However, it 
misjudged the mood of the public, and with a turnout of 61.7%, Scotland voted ‘Yes’ 
by 58.4%. The referendum result forced the SNP to re-think its attitude towards the 
EEC and from 1979, the SNP’s first elected representative in the European 
Parliament, Winnie Ewing, ‘imported a more positive European dimension into the 
party’ (Lynch 1996: 37). The SNP also began arguing for a stronger role for Scotland 
in Europe, and with the enlistment of Jim Sillars, a former Labour politician, the SNP 
began to develop positive linkages between EEC membership and Scottish self-
government (Lynch 1996; Hepburn 2006).  
 
Independence in an integrating Europe 
The SNP adopted a policy of ‘independence in Europe’ in 1988 in response to 
accusations of trying to ‘divorce’ Scotland from the rest of the UK. The justifications 
for this policy appeared to be largely pragmatic: not only would the European context 
provide an external political support system for a small country such as Scotland, but 
also an economic one, by removing the threat of economic dislocation from England 
through the European common market, and providing potential security safeguards 
without the need to join organisations such as NATO. The SNP became an avid 
supporter of economic and monetary integration, and high-ranking members of the 
Party, such as Roseanna Cunningham, indicated that the SNP would be happy to grant 
the EU powers over defence and foreign policy.1 Membership of the EU therefore 
appears to lessen many of the transition costs of independence through access to the 
common market, structural funds for underperforming areas, and a ready-made 
institutional system in which small states have a disproportionate voice. As former 
party leader Gordon Wilson stated, ‘within the common trading umbrella, the move to 
independence can take place smoothly and easily’ (cited in Lynch 2002: 6). Support 
for such integrationist measures, however, raise questions about how independent 
Scotland would actually be as a full EU member state, and to what extent 
                                                 
1 Interview with Roseanna Cunningham, former Deputy Leader of the SNP, 14 January 2004. 
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independence would actually give Scotland the territorial capacity to manage 
processes of social and economic change, given that economic and social policy in 
European member states is now largely impinged upon by EU regulations.  
There has been significant contestation within the SNP about how the goal of 
independence in Europe should be achieved, and what kind of Europe the SNP would 
like to see being developed. For instance, when the policy was adopted in the late 
1980s, there was ambiguity as to whether the Party supported centralisation or 
decentralisation, or federalism versus confederalism in the EU. Those within the 
‘supranationalist’ camp advocated closer European unification, in which a central 
authority would have control over foreign policy, defence and a single currency. 
Contrarily, those who positioned themselves within the intergovernmentalist camp 
argued for the primacy of states, whereby powers would only be transferred to the EU 
if the members states so decided. Alan Macartney MEP (1990) made an attempt to 
clarify where the SNP stood in these issues. He argued that the goal would entail the 
creation of a European confederation, that is, an association of member states which 
pool sovereignty in certain areas but do not surrender total control to an authoritative 
body. This would allow Scotland to exert equal influence over decision-making as 
other small member states. This view is reflected in Scotland – A European Nation 
(SNP 1992: 5), where it is stated that ‘many decisions affecting the lives of every 
European will continue to be taken in Brussels. And…those decisions will be reached 
by representatives of independent member states in the Council of Ministers’.  
However, despite aiming for a confederal Europe with power concentrated at 
the member-state level in the Council of Ministers, the SNP also became active in 
debates about the regionalisation of Europe. For instance, it favoured the creation of a 
Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1993, an issue which split the party when SNP 
leaders made a secret ‘deal’ with the Conservative government to win more seats on 
the Committee for Scotland (The Scotsman, 9 April 1993). The SNP was also 
supportive of the establishment of Scotland House, the creation of a Scottish Minister 
for European and External Affairs, the development of stronger links between the 
Scottish Parliament and other substate governments in Europe, and has talked at 
length about the need to implement the principles of ‘subsidiarity’ within the EU’s 
member states. Since taking office in 2007, the SNP has furthermore argued that 
Scottish Ministers in the devolved Parliament should be given the right to participate 
in the EU Council of Ministers’ meetings, and to take the lead in UK delegations on 
matters of relevance to Scotland. This strategy represents the triumph of the 
‘gradualist’ wing over the fundamentalists. By seeking to gradually expand the 
powers of the Scottish Parliament, in particular in its European relations, the SNP has 
realized how much a devolved parliament could do in Europe – something that other 
nationalist parties in Europe have long played towards. But SNP demands for a 
stronger Scottish presence in Europe also put into question the fundamentalist 
position of how much sovereignty the SNP really wants for Scotland. In particular, 
gaining Scottish representation on the Council of Ministers (albeit through the UK 
delegation) would arguably meet one of the main aims of independence in Europe.  
So what could an independent Scotland in Europe actually do? Keating (2002) 
argues that the three main functions that Scotland would seek to repatriate from 
Westminster (defence and foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary policy and social 
security) would be highly constrained by European integration, globalisation and ties 
to the rest of the UK. On defence and foreign affairs, an independent Scotland would 
not be able to defend itself from foreign attack, and would rely on a future European 
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defence and security system (given the party’s hostility to joining NATO). However, 
as a small member state in the EU, it may not have much control over the direction of 
security policy. On fiscal and monetary affairs, there is a risk that Scotland becomes 
too dependent on oil revenues (which is dangerous given volatile prices), or 
international markets (so Scotland would be fearful of doing anything to detract 
investors). The SNP also proposes to give up an independent currency in favour of the 
European currency (Euro), though it would be vulnerable to fluctuations in the pound 
if the rest of the UK does not join. And on social security, an independent Scotland 
would no longer be able to pool economic shocks resulting from recession with the 
UK, though it could use social integration to adapt to change, as the Nordic countries 
have done (Keating 2002: 292).  
From a different perspective, the SNP’s principled support for integrationist 
measures, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the process of 
Eastern enlargement, have masked a subtle protectionist edge to SNP discourse. Since 
the early 2000s, the SNP has taken a strong stand on the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and has even threatened at times to opt 
out of these policies altogether in order to protect Scotland’s fishing and agricultural 
sectors. This indicates that the SNP is unsure whether certain integrationist measures 
actually benefit Scotland’s interests, or whether they may even threaten Scotland. For 
instance, the SNP has argued that although it supported the European currency, it also 
held a ‘rigorously critical view of excessive Euro-enthusiasm, and creeping 
integrationism. We have a robust view of the need to set clear limits to what can 
properly be done at the all-Europe level and what must be retained by the states and 
their regions in accordance with subsidiarity’ (SNP 2001: 1-2). Therefore, a number 
of contradictions exist within the SNP’s policy programme, whose support of further 
European integration in matters of monetary and economic policy, defence and 
security, sits awkwardly with the party’s demands for an intergovernmental Europe 
with power residing among the states. As Keating (2002: 294) sums up, 
‘independence in Europe involves swapping classic sovereignty for influence within a 
complex system of decision-making’. The EU is not only an association of states; it 
can also be seen a normative order that profoundly affects the sovereignty of its 
members, undermining its claim to claim a monopoly of authority over its territory, 
and eroded its functional powers (MacCormick 1999; Keating 2002). In the context of 
closer European integration, many important legislative decisions regarding defence, 
security and monetary policy are being increasingly centralised at the European level, 
leaving both independent and devolved parliaments with the same competences over 
social policy. This means that the difference between devolution and independence is 
not quite as clear-cut as the SNP (and Labour) suggests.  
 
Devolution and Degrees of Independence 
In many ways, devolution has benefited the Scottish National Party by giving it a new 
platform for its demands. Cross-national evidence demonstrates that nationalist parties 
perform better in regional than statewide elections, and the SNP is no exception as we 
saw in May 2007. When taking office in Holyrood, one of the SNP’s first actions was 
to publish a white paper setting out Scotland’s constitutional options in August 2007, 
entitled Choosing Scotland’s Future and to launch a consultative ‘national 
conversation’ on these options. As party of government, the SNP is in a position to 
influence public opinion on the merits of independence, and has a range of 
mechanisms at its disposal to do so. Furthermore, with a range of new institutions 
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including a Scottish Government and a Scottish Parliament, devolution has de facto 
lowered the institutional barriers to independence.  
However, devolution has also created new barriers to independence. In the 
additional-member system (AMS) electoral system of the Scottish Parliament, 
governments will most likely be of a minority or a coalition nature. The SNP was 
forced into the former scenario in May 2007, when the Liberal Democrats refused to 
enter a coalition. Minority government presents significant challenges for the party, 
requiring it to compromise on policy issues and seek consensus with others. It also 
means that the unionist opposition – which represents a majority in the Parliament – 
can veto any legislation to hold an independence referendum. Yet perhaps a greater 
problem is that devolution appears to have lessened popular demand for 
independence. Even though the SNP won the Scottish Parliament election in 2007, it 
was not on the back of popular demand for independence. Indeed, support for 
independence at that moment was 25% (less than half the support for devolution) 
(McCrone 2009: 93). So for the time being, it appears that devolution has managed to 
constrain demands for independence. 
Furthermore, the transformation of the SNP from opposition movement to 
party of government does not come without its problems. Governing at the regional 
level puts any independence-seeking party in a difficult position. The SNP’s main 
demand is for an independent Scotland, but at the same time it must demonstrate that 
it can effectively implement its policies in a devolved Scotland in order to win the 
next election. To do so, the SNP has sought to downplay its main goal by delivering 
independence ‘by stealth’. This means seeking to gradually build upon the 1998 
devolved settlement to the point where independence seems the next natural step. This 
strategy of accelerationism might allow the party to make more ‘constitutional 
progress through arguing for ‘more’ independence for Scotland rather than absolute 
independence’ (Lynch 2000: 253). Yet there is also the danger that expanding the 
powers of the Scottish Parliament (so many of the general aims of self-government 
are achieved), undermines the actual need for independence. In this context, 
independence and devolution would become increasingly difficult to distinguish.  
Given low public support for independence, Lynch (2005: 511) argues that the 
SNP must either somehow convert voters to the merits of independence, or to offer a 
new constitutional option, like the Parti Québécois did in the 1995 referendum on 
Quebec’s ‘sovereignty-partnership’ with Canada. The SNP has opted for the latter 
strategy, by demanding more powers for the Scottish Parliament (especially on 
Europe), fiscal autonomy and ‘devolution max’. On the first issue, the SNP has 
advocated the expansion of the Scottish Parliament’s powers on European matters, as 
well granting the Executive a representative role in European institutions on a par 
with the German Länder or Belgian regions. Furthermore, the party wishes to expand 
the Scottish Parliament’s control and influence over areas like energy, welfare, 
transport, defence and immigration – powers that are currently exercised by 
Westminster, but which the SNP believes a devolved Scotland should have. On the 
issue of fiscal autonomy, the SNP has proposed gaining the right to set tax rates, 
define tax bases and raise the money that the Parliament spends through borrowing. 
This would improve the devolved Parliament’s accountability to the electorate, and 
the responsibility of MSPs by forcing more discipline into spending decisions.  
In 2008, the SNP repackaged these proposals as ‘devolution-max’. At the 
time, Finance Secretary John Swinney declared that he was to consider a watered-
down form of independence, whereby full financial powers would be devolved to 
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Scotland, giving the parliament control over everything except monetary policy. 
Cynics might argue that that this strategy was only to gain Liberal Democratic or 
Conservative support for an independence referendum, to pass the legislation through 
the Scottish Parliament.2 Others could reason that the SNP was merely responding to 
public opinion, whereby the majority of support was for increased powers for the 
Scottish Parliament and not independence (McCrone 2009). But another argument 
could also be made that devolution-max represented a ‘softer’ form of independence 
that recognized the extensive interdependencies between Scotland and the rest of the 
UK and Europe, which was part of a long tradition of SNP accommodation of various 
forms of shared sovereignty in its constitutional goals.  
Recently, the SNP has highlighted its commitment to continuing partnership 
with England and other parts of the UK were Scotland to secede. SNP Minister Bruce 
Crawford speaks of a ‘Kingdom of United Countries’ of the British Isles, whereby it 
is necessary for ‘governments across the UK and Europe to work together to face 
today’s problems’.3 This reiterates SNP leader Alex Salmond’s proposal to create a 
‘Council of the Isles’ with joint decision-making machinery that brings Scotland, 
Ireland, Wales and Northern Ireland together to discuss issues of relevance (see 
Wright’s contribution to this book). It is clear that, owing to the deep unpopularity of 
the EU following the failed draft Constitution, the SNP has focussed once again on 
the ‘UK partnership’ dimension of its self-determination claims rather than the 
European dimension. This is noticeable in its paper Choosing Scotland’s Future 
(Scottish Executive 2007). The SNP highlight the extensive linkages and 
interdependencies between Scotland and the rest of the UK, including cross-border 
public services, policy initiatives and the unifying presence of the British monarchy. 
This softer position on independence may be indicate that party members are 
following in the footsteps of the late Neil MacCormick MEP (son of John 
MacCormick) – an ‘unrepentant gradualist’ – in accepting more flexible 
interpretations of independence. As MacCormick (1999) argued: ‘independence, 
freedom, sovereignty. All names, all labels. The SNP is part of a long, wide 
movement for self-government, autonomy. Now that in my definition would mean 
autonomy in whatever overall context of governance is sensible, constructive, 
forward-looking and also expressive of solidarity’. 
 
SNP demands in an international context 
Whilst the SNP has focussed its constitutional demands on independence, nationalist 
parties elsewhere have tended to seek unique forms of autonomy within state and 
supranational structures that fall short of full sovereign statehood. With the exception 
of the independence platforms of the ETA-associated Herri Batasuna and left-wing 
Eusko Alkartasuna, most nationalist parties have repeatedly rejected outright 
independence in response to the changing opportunities for self-determination 
resulting from globalisation and supranational integration. The Union Démocratique 
Bretonne (UDB) in Breton, the Unione di u Popule Corsu (UPC) in Corsica, the 
Union Valdotaine in Val d’Aosta, and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) in 
                                                 
2 This argument was made in the Scottish media. See 
http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2491536.0.Swinney_pushes_devolution_max_as_
the_best_way_forward.php [accessed 10 May 2009] 
3 Bruce Crawford, Scottish Minister for Parliamentary Business, Keynote Speech to the conference on 
‘Ten Years of the Scottish Parliament: Achievements and Futures’, Edinburgh, 12 May 2009.  
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Galicia have all developed autonomy goals that amount to something less than 
secession, where state sovereignty is no longer the issue.  
 To take some relevant examples, the Convergence and Union Party (CiU) in 
Catalonia does not believe that Catalonia must be independent to be self-determining. 
Instead, it frames Catalan nationalism within the Spanish and European contexts, 
emphasising the linkages and interdependencies that Catalan can take advantage of by 
operating in multiple spheres of influence. The CiU believes that Catalan nationalism 
has prospered with its integration into Europe, and to that end it is an avid supporter 
of a Europe of the Regions. Likewise, the constitutional aims of the nationalist 
Sardinian Action Party (Psd’Az) are more subtle than simply demanding 
independence (Hepburn 2009b). The party wishes to construct a federal Italy as part 
of a federalised Europe, in which Sardinia can exercise maximum autonomy. It 
supports the creation of a ‘European Federation of the Peoples’, in which the Italian 
federal state would have limited competences over currency, justice and defence, and 
the regions and nations would be responsible for everything else (Psd’Az 2003). But 
sooner or later the Psd’Az claims that these powers over defence, justice and 
monetary policy will be transferred to the European level in a federalising structure, 
so the Italian state is rendered obsolete and the regions obtain primary status in 
Europe. As a result, Sardinia would be freed of its ties to the Italian state without 
formally separating from it. Similarly, Plaid Cymru has also rejected full 
independence for Wales in an integrating Europe. Instead, the party has sought to 
secure Welsh self-determination first within a Britannic Confederation and then 
within a Europe of the Peoples. In each of the manifestations of Welsh nationalism, 
the ‘principled rejection of sovereign statehood continued to inform Plaid Cymru’s 
long-term constitutional thinking’ (Elias 2009). Finally, what many scholars would 
argue is the closest comparator to the SNP, the Parti Québécois, has also taken heed 
of the realities of economic and political interdependence in a globalising world, and 
its need to maintain formal links with the rest of Canada. The party moved from 
supporting a form of ‘sovereignty-association’ in 1980, to ‘partnership with Canada’ 
in 1995, to support for a ‘confederal Union’ with a common Quebec-Canadian 
parliament in 2003 (Sorens 2004). The party presented these linkages to Canada as a 
form of insurance policy against the risks of full independence. Moreover, it believed 
that institutionalised interdependence in the form of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) would provide the necessary external support for an 
independent Quebec (Keating 2001). Clearly, the CiU, Psd’Az, Plaid Cymru, Parti 
Québécois and others have been able to successfully integrate the notions of shared 
sovereignty in an integrating Europe and a globalising world into their core 
constitutional objectives – a trend that the SNP has not fully incorporated into its self-
determination goals, but not fully rejected either.  
 
Conclusion: Independence in a Post-Sovereign World 
The last few decades have witnessed enormous changes to the structure, competences, 
legislative framework, economy and political systems of states (Keating 2001; 
MacCormick 1999; Bartolini 2005). The twin processes of supranational integration 
and decentralisation have resulted in a far-reaching process of spatial rescaling. This 
transformation of the state has radically altered the meaning of independence, 
whereby the state is no longer the only source of ultimate authority (Keating 2001; 
Tierney 2005). Instead, scholars have begun to examine the implications of 
‘variegated’ or shared sovereignty, whereby states are not so much independent as 
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‘interdependent’ (MacCormick 1999; Keating 2002; Walker 2002). This is part of the 
shift away from conventional understandings of sovereignty focused on the nation-
state and the (consequent) re-discovery that sovereignty was never as fully focused on 
the nation-state as the conventions of postwar social science would have us think.  
As a result, some scholars have asked why substate actors continue to demand 
independence when the very concept of state sovereignty is losing its meaning 
(Tierney 2005: 161). For instance, if we define sovereignty as consisting of ‘a 
plausible claim to ultimate authority made on behalf of a particular polity’ (Walker 
2002: 345), how much sovereignty can a state in the EU now claim, when many of its 
competences have been shifted upwards? Tierney (2005) argues that in response to 
these developments, nationalist parties have developed a more nuanced approach, 
seeking complex constitutional arrangements within and beyond the state. Such 
aspirations are evident in the self-determination goals of nationalist parties in 
Catalonia, Quebec, Sardinia, Wales and elsewhere, who have not only responded to 
global interdependencies, but have further sought to radically transform the nature of 
the state itself. Seeking self-determination within larger political and economic 
structures is especially important if the territory possesses a small population and few 
resources, and its chances of ‘survival’, or being able to maintain pre-independence 
standards of living, seem small. This issue has become more pressing in the light of 
the current economic downturn, where small countries such as Iceland and Ireland 
have been rocked by collapsed banks and deep recession. Critics argued that an 
independent Scotland would not have been able to afford bailing out its two major 
financial institutions – the Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS (Halifax Bank of 
Scotland). This puts the SNP’s economic case for independence into question, despite 
the probability that if an independent Scotland were part of the Eurozone, it would 
have received financial help from European institutions. But this fact in itself serves 
to highlight the dependent nature of an independent Scotland on Europe.  
Because of these issues, the SNP has been forced to revise its notions of 
absolute Scottish sovereignty. It has moved to supporting ‘degrees of independence’ 
for Scotland, which have been affected by considerations of state partnership, 
European integration and globalisation. This has been evident in its reformulation of 
the goal of independence in Europe, its emphasis on the gradual accumulation of 
powers within larger political structures, and its commitment to maintaining close 
economic, public services and symbolic ties to the UK. This move to an 
‘accelerationist’ strategy places the SNP more firmly within the nationalist party 
family camp, which has predominantly sought to achieve self-determination within 
larger networks of decentred sovereignty. However, contradictions still remain within 
the SNP’s interpretation of independence, in particular the implications of an 
integrating Europe. Whilst the SNP has expressed a principled commitment to 
European integration, in recent years it has articulated several reservations about the 
scope and direction of future integration. In particular, it has criticised the European 
agriculture and fisheries policy, threatened to oppose the draft Constitution in a 
national referendum, and opposed the encroachment of certain European regulations 
on current devolved competences and a future independent Scotland’s powers 
(Hepburn 2008). One wonders: how feasible is independence in Europe, when the 
party does not support aspects of Europe? This is another tension in the party, 
alongside the gradualist-fundamentalist divide, that has historically plagued the party, 
and is set to continue to do so in the aftermath of the failed European Constitution and 
a notable rise in hostility to the European project amongst the British electorate.  
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